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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY’S BITE OUT OF THE BIG APPLE:
THE PROBLEM OF UNRESTRICTED EMINENT DOMAIN IN
NEW YORK AND THE NEED FOR MORE ACTIVE COURTS
Katherine McGlynn Mirett

I.

*

INTRODUCTION

Gurnam Singh came to the United States from India in 1981
1
with his brother. Through his own hard work, determination, and
tenacity, he created his family-operated business in Manhattanville, a
neighborhood located in the western part of New York City’s Har2
lem. Singh and his wife own a home in Queens, two gasoline stations
in Manhattanville, both located on West 125th Street, and they hope
3
to send their daughter to medical school.
Nicholas Sprayregen is another small-business owner in the
4
Manhattanville neighborhood. His properties include Tuck-it-Away
5
storage facilities on Broadway, West 131st, and West 125th streets.
Sprayregen, sympathetic to the Singhs’ struggle, called the Singhs a
6
“prime example of the American dream.” Unwilling to go down
without a fight, Sprayregen proudly flew banners outside of his build7
ings which exclaimed: “Stop Columbia! We Won’t Be Pushed Out!”
What sort of a fight? Both of these men represent a small minority of landowners in West Harlem who were willing to stand up to Co-

*

J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2006,
University of Michigan. Thank you to Professor Paula Franzese for her invaluable
guidance throughout the writing process. The author would also like to thank her
family, especially her grandparents for their endless enthusiasm through this and all
endeavors, and Matt for his unconditional encouragement and support, without
which this Comment could not have been written.
1
Timothy Williams, 2 Gas Stations, and a Family’s Resolve, Confront Columbia’s Expansion Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008, at A39.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 724 (N.Y. 2010).
6
Williams, supra note 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
7
James Barron, Self-Storage King Takes a Moment to Savor His Victory Over Columbia,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2009 at A14 (internal quotation marks omitted).

423

MCGLYNN_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2/13/2012 9:51 AM

424

[Vol. 42:423

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
8

lumbia University’s (“Columbia”) intrusive expansion that threatened to destroy the “American dreams” of many. Columbia University certainly has a strong interest in expanding its campus and developing new resources for its privately-educated students. Most
landowners in the project area were mere speed bumps in the
9
process, but Singh and Sprayregen represent a group of people
whose lives are forever changed because of Columbia’s uncompromising desire to provide additional resources to its privileged stu10
dents.
These courageous landowners expended substantial resources to bring a suit, Kaur v. New York State Urban Development Corp.,
challenging their properties’ designation as “blighted” alleging that
the stated “public use” was merely a pretext for conferring private
11
benefits to Columbia. Despite their efforts, the courts undeservedly
provided considerable deference to the legislative determinations of
12
“blight” and “public use.” Columbia’s expansion illustrates the adverse consequences of eminent domain and the dangerous power of
private interests. Courts need to play a stronger and more active role
in eminent domain challenges, particularly in those cases in which
the plaintiff claims that the stated public purpose is merely a pretext
for conferring a benefit on a private entity. To accomplish this,
courts should demand that the local governmental organization
demonstrate with “reasonable certainty” that the stated public benefits will actually flow from a particular project; the government should
not merely hope that the stated benefits will occur.
Part II of this Comment explains the Columbia University plan.
Next, Part III provides an overview of the Takings Clause and public
use in addition to exploring the nature of pretext challenges. Part IV
describes the history of eminent domain jurisprudence, first detailing
the three major Supreme Court eminent domain decisions and then
describing the New York state court cases that led to the Kaur decision. Part V details the various problems associated with an expansive
view of public use. Part VI revisits the Kaur decision in light of the existing eminent domain jurisprudence and finds that, given the courts’
prior treatment of pretext challenges, the result is not surprising. Finally, Part VI also considers whether courts or legislatures are better
equipped to determine public purpose and proposes that courts
8

See Williams, supra note 1.
Id. Williams reports that the Singhs and Sprayregen are the only two landowners in the redevelopment area who refused to sell their property to Columbia. Id.
10
Id.
11
Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 724 (N.Y. 2010).
12
See id. at 730–31.
9
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should require an evidentiary showing that the stated public purposes
of the eminent domain project will actually accrue.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE COLUMBIA EXPANSION PLAN
It is crucial to understand the complicated history of the Columbia project in order to comprehend the challenges that Singh
and Sprayregen raised. Columbia University’s main campus is located in the Morningside Heights neighborhood of Manhattan, running approximately from West 113th Street to West 122nd Street,
bounded by Morningside Drive to the east and Broadway to the
13
west. Columbia’s plan will greatly expand the campus to the north
and west; the project site extends from the south side of West 135th
Street to the north side of West 133rd Street and is bound by Broad14
way/Old Broadway to the east and 12th Avenue to the west.
Columbia first approached the New York City Economic Development Corporation (EDC) to redevelop the West Harlem area in
2001, at which point the EDC performed a preliminary economic
15
study of the neighborhood. The EDC issued its report in August
2002 and set out various strategies for “economic redevelopment” of
16
the area. In 2003, the EDC hired Urbitran Associates, an engineering, architecture, and planning firm, to conduct its own survey of the
neighborhood, which, when issued by the EDC in 2004, found that
17
the neighborhood merited a “blighted” designation. The study focused its analysis on four major criteria: signs of deterioration, substandard or unsanitary conditions, adequacy of infrastructure, and indications of the impairment of sound growth in the surrounding
18
community.
During this time, Columbia began to purchase property located
19
within the project site. Columbia approached both the Singhs and
20
Sprayregen about the potential purchase of their properties. For
the Singhs, the proposed purchase amount was far too low consider21
ing the success of their business. Sprayregen, another successful
13

See Interactive Map of Morningside Campus, COLUM. U., http://www.columbia.
edu/about_columbia/map/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).
14
Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 724.
15
Id. at 725.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Barron, supra note 7; Williams, supra note 1.
21
Williams, supra note 1.
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businessman, committed himself to fighting the expansion plan led
by the belief that “eminent domain always seems to be used against
the down-and-out, people who can’t fight back in a meaningful way. I
22
can.”
The EDC met with Columbia and the Empire State Development
Corporation (ESDC) in March 2004 to discuss the condemnation of
23
the Singhs’ and Sprayregen’s land. Columbia hired an environmental planning and consulting firm, Alee King Rosen & Fleming
24
(AKRF), to assist in obtaining approval for the project. Significantly,
the ESDC had previously relied on AKRF’s findings of blight in the
25
Atlantic Yards project in Brooklyn. Around the same time, Colum26
bia agreed to pay ESDC’s costs associated with the project. In November 2007, AKRF, on Columbia’s payroll, unsurprisingly found
that the proposed project site was blighted, and Columbia began to
move toward obtaining the requisite agency approval from the New
York City Planning Commission (“Planning Commission”) to carry
27
out the expansion plan. The Planning Commission approved the
rezoning that permitted Columbia to construct “a new urban cam28
pus” to be integrated with open, public space. The Planning Commission also noted that the ESDC was permitted to use eminent do29
main to further the plan’s stated public benefits.
At the same time, business owners in the project area, including
the Singhs and Sprayregen, requested documents to examine the re30
lationship between the ESDC, AKRF, and AKRF’s finding of blight.
The New York State Supreme Court’s Appellate Division ordered Co31
lumbia to hand over the documents. Due to the concerns raised
22
Robin Finn, Pushing Back as Columbia Moves to Spread out, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11,
2008, at B2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
23
Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 725–26.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 726 n.6 (citing Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164,
166 (N.Y. 2009)). Goldstein permitted the taking of private property for a privately
developed land-use improvement project known as the Atlantic Yards in Brooklyn.
Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 165. In Goldstein, the court relied on the blight study conducted by AKRF and found that even though a dispute existed between the parties as
to whether the area truly was “substandard and insanitary” (the New York legislative
definition of “blight”), the dispute was not a sufficient predicate for the court to supplant the study’s determination. Id. at 173.
26
Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 726.
27
Id. at 727.
28
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
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about the accuracy of AKRF’s survey because of its previous work for
the ESDC in connection with Atlantic Yards in Brooklyn, the ESDC
conducted another survey with an independent firm, Earth Tech,
32
which essentially confirmed the previous survey’s findings of blight.
On July 17, 2008, the ESDC adopted a General Project Plan that
33
would enable Columbia to move forward with its plan. The ESDC
designated the project as a “land use improvement project” and a
“civic project” and specified the public uses, benefits, and purposes of
34
the project. First, the ESDC found that the project would address
the city and statewide need for educational, community, recreational,
35
cultural, and other civic facilities. The ESDC observed that Manhattanville “suffered from long-term poor maintenance, lack of development and disinvestment” and that the project would help turn
36
around these bleak conditions. Second, the ESDC determined that
the project would create approximately 14,000 jobs during the construction period in addition to 6,000 permanent jobs following com37
pletion. Third, the project would also, according to the ESDC, gen38
erate substantial revenue for the state and city. Fourth, the ESDC
claimed that the project would also create much needed public
space, “approximately 94,000 square feet of accessible open space
and maintained as such in perpetuity that will be punctuated by trees,
open vistas, paths, landscaping and street furniture and an additional
well-lit 28,000 square feet of space of widened sidewalks that will in39
vite east-west pedestrian traffic.” Fifth, the ESDC acknowledged that
Columbia would open a limited number of its facilities, including libraries and computer centers, to students attending a new public
school to which Columbia would provide rent-free land for forty-nine
40
years. In addition, Columbia also promised to open its new swim41
ming facilities to the public. Finally, the ESDC determined that the
project would improve local infrastructure—including the 125th

32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 727–28.
Id. at 729.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 729.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
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Street subway station—through a substantial investment by Columbia
42
in the newly created West Harlem Piers Park.
III. OVERVIEW OF EMINENT DOMAIN: WHY CAN THE GOVERNMENT
TAKE PRIVATE PROPERTY?
The final sentence of the Fifth Amendment, commonly called
the Takings Clause, provides that “nor shall private property be taken
43
for public use, without just compensation.” Technically, the Takings
Clause only restricts the federal government, but its provisions have
been held equally applicable to state and local governments through
44
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Takings Clause operates whenever the government “takes”
private property. The Constitution authorizes the government to
take private property only if the taking is for a public use and the
45
government pays “just compensation” to the ousted landowner. On
the surface, the Takings Clause appears to give landowners some solace—it requires the government to pay the landowner compensation
for whatever land it takes in addition to ensuring that the government takes land for public use, rather than for private use. Indeed,
Justice Thomas confirmed that the Takings Clause is not a grant of
governmental power, but rather a prohibition: “The Constitution
does not expressly grant the Federal Government the power to take
property for any public purpose whatsoever. Instead, the Government may take property only when necessary and proper to the exer46
cise of an expressly enumerated power.” As described below, a literal understanding of the Takings Clause is flawed; through the phrase
“public use,” governments have found many ways to abuse the takings
47
power. Thus, Justice Thomas is perhaps better understood as admonishing the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of “public use.”
Public use is a key element in the Takings Clause. The public
use requirement is important because, in theory, it ensures that the
government may only compel an individual to forfeit his or her property rights for the public’s use, not to give a benefit to another private
48
person. Courts, however, have interpreted “public use” to be quite
42

Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
44
See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
45
Carol L. Zeiner, Eminent Domain Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing: Private Benefit Masquerading as Classic Public Use, 28 VA. ENVTL L.J. 1, 8 (2010).
46
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 511 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
47
Id.
48
Id. at 497 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
43
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elastic, and, on many occasions, governments have used the public
use requirement to transfer private property from one individual to
49
another private individual.
Indeed, the United States Supreme
Court has recognized that “public use” stands for two opposite propositions:
[O]n the one hand, it has long been accepted that the sovereign
may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation. On the other hand, it is equally clear that a State may
transfer property from one private party to another if future ‘use
50
by the public’ is the purpose of the taking.

Judicial interpretation of public use has varied in breadth over the
past couple of centuries.
51
In the 19th century, state courts, specifically New York courts,
embraced a close, narrow definition of public use that required ac52
tual “use by the public” to satisfy the test. This test, however, proved
to be problematic to administer, as it was difficult to determine how
53
much use by the public was required to qualify as public use. As industry grew rapidly and the federal courts began applying the Takings Clause to the states at the beginning of the 20th century, courts
54
welcomed a more expansive definition of public use.
55
Through landmark public use cases like Berman v. Parker, Ha56
57
waii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, and Kelo v. City of New London, the
49
See e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (majority opinion) (upholding the condemnation of
private residences to allow Pfizer, a private pharmaceutical corporation, to build a
new facility on the land).
50
Id. at 477.
51
Nineteenth century decisions in New York made clear that private property
could not be transferred to another private individual unless the second private owner’s use of the land was a meaningful, clear “public” use. See In re Niagara Falls &
Whirlpool Ry. Co., 108 N.Y. 375 (1888) (taking of private property for construction
of a privately run sightseeing railroad not public use); In re Deansville Cemetery
Assn., 66 N.Y. 569 (1876) (taking of private land for construction of a cemetery is not
a public use); Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140 (Sup. Ct. 1843) (taking of land for a private
road not allowed).
52
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 479.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 480; see also Philip Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent
Domain, 20 B.U. L. REV. 615, 626–29 (1940). Nichols argues that the narrow public
use doctrine—“[t]o take property rights from A to transfer to B for B’s private enjoyment is not a public use, regardless of what ultimate public purpose the transaction is intended to further”—was decaying as early as the 1920s when courts began to
uphold condemnation for slum clearance and for the building of private housing.
Id. at 626 (internal quotation marks omitted).
55
348 U.S. 26 (1954).
56
467 U.S. 229 (1984).
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Court embraced a more flexible notion of “public use” by adopting a
58
“public purpose” test. Under the “public purpose” test, property
taken for a legitimate public purpose and taken within the scope of
59
the legislature’s police power satisfies the public use requirement.
The test does not include any requirement that the public actually
use the land taken from the private landowner; it only requires that
the taking of the land serve a general public purpose. Included in
this broad public purpose is the elimination of blight, a term describing the condition of neighborhoods that contain substandard housing (i.e., housing not fit for human habitation in that it is “injurious
60
to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare”). At first, the designation of blight was aimed at eliminating real threats to public
safety; however, current blight designations can include intangible
61
“harm,” such as economic disinvestment. Open-ended blight definitions, such as that in New York, are troublesome because they provide
ways for local governments to circumvent the public use requirement
62
as it is traditionally understood. This broad public purpose definition is problematic because, as noted by Justice O’Connor, when the
courts interpret it liberally, it affords almost no limit on the danger63
ous power of eminent domain. It rationally follows that almost any
government taking could be designated as “blighted,” therefore serving a public purpose and thus satisfying the public use requirement
of the Takings Clause, so long as the stated public purpose appears
legitimate on its face.
Like Sprayregen and the Singhs in the Kaur case, many plaintiffs
64
challenge governmental takings under the concept of “pretext.”
65
There are a number of different types of governmental takings.
First, the sovereign may transfer private property to public ownership
66
for purposes such as creating a road, a hospital, or a military base.
57

545 U.S. 469 (2005).
For a detailed discussion of the three cases, see infra Part IV-A.
59
See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480.
60
Berman, 348 U.S. at 28.
61
See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
62
50 State Report Card: Tracking Eminent Domain Reform Legislation Since Kelo,
CASTLE COALITION (July 16, 2009), www.castlecoalition.org/about/component/
content/2412?taxk=view [hereinafter CASTLE COALITION].
63
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 501 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
64
See discussion infra Part IV.
65
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 497 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
66
Id.; see also Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57
OR. L. REV. 203, 225 (1977). Professor Berger distinguishes between public takings
and private takings. Id. Similarly to Justice O’Connor’s first classification, he explains
58
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This type of transfer is relatively uncontroversial. Second, the sovereign may transfer private property to another private party who then
68
makes the property available to the general public. Examples of
such transfers include the construction of railroads, public utilities,
69
and stadiums. While still owned by a private entity, the property is
open for use by the general public, and like the first type of transfer,
70
this transfer is relatively uncontroversial. The third type of taking is
the most controversial and occurs when the sovereign transfers pri71
vate property to another private party for that party’s private use.
This occurs often in the context of “economic revitalization” projects
and these cases, like Kaur, typically turn on the question of whether
the stated public purpose of the project satisfies the public use re72
quirement of the Takings Clause. Pretext challenges claim that the
true purposes of the government taking are not the public benefits
explicitly listed as part of the project plan but rather to bestow a benefit on a more favored private party at the expense of other private
73
home and business owners. Typically in these challenges, it appears
that the government is in fact facilitating a transfer of private land to
another private owner while stripping the original owner of his or her
property rights. In the Kaur case, for example, the Singhs and
Sprayregen challenged the ESDC findings on the grounds that the
project only served the private interests of Columbia and not the in74
terests of the general public. As a result, Singh and Sprayregen argued that the public benefits listed as the purpose of the project were

that a “public taking is one which benefits large numbers of persons in a nondiscriminatory and non-exclusionary manner. Takings for railroads, hospitals, streets and
governmental buildings would clearly come within the classification.” Id.
67
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 497 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
68
Id. at 498; see also Berger, supra note 66, at 225. Professor Berger explains that
this second type of transfer is “not normally considered to be a ‘public use’ under
traditional eminent domain doctrine [but] would also come within the classification.
Thus, industrial plants and even hotels (assuming they are open to all members of
the public) would for purposes of this analysis be classified as ‘public.’” Id.
69
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 498 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
70
Id.; see also Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y.
2009) (holding that a taking of private property for the building of a new sports stadium, which was to be privately-owned yet open to the public, constituted sufficient
public use).
71
Kelo, 545 U.S at 498 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Berger, supra note 66, at
226. Professor Berger explains that “[a]s a general proposition, . . . a private taking
is one which benefits one, or a relatively limited number of people.” Id.
72
Kelo, 545 U.S at 498 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
73
Zeiner, supra note 45, at 9.
74
Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 730 (N.Y. 2010).
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a mere pretext for the government to use the immense power of
eminent domain to transfer their private property to Columbia.
IV. THE PATH TO EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE
In order to fully understand the depth and strength of the public purpose test and courts’ great deference to the legislature, one
should review a number of key federal decisions in the past century
that shed light on the evolution of eminent domain jurisprudence.
Twentieth century courts endorse a broader notion of “public purpose” than those in the nineteenth century did. Particularly relevant
is the great deference both federal and state courts give to legislative
definitions of blight and public purpose in rendering eminent domain decisions.
Before exploring the New York courts’ application of the public
use requirement, it is necessary to first examine the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Takings Clause.
A.

The Big Three
1.

Berman v. Parker

Berman was the first of the “big three” Supreme Court eminent
75
domain decisions rendered during the past century. In Berman, the
District of Columbia condemned plaintiff’s department store—
located in a blighted area—as part of a large-scale urban renewal
76
program to eliminate unsafe, unsanitary, and unsightly buildings.
The District of Columbia planned to sell the land to private enterprises that would build privately-owned projects consistent with the
77
redevelopment plan. The plaintiffs argued for an injunction, asserting that the project was simply taking from one businessman “for the
78
benefit of another businessman.” The plaintiffs argued that this was
a private-owner-to-private-owner transfer, and because the project
appeared at its heart to promote only the development of a “more attractive community,” that the project did not serve any “public pur79
pose.” Unfortunately, the Court disagreed and focused its analysis
on the purpose for the government taking, not the true identity of fu80
ture land users. The Court expanded the public purpose test and
75
76
77
78
79
80

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
Id. at 28.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 35–36.
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noted that “the public end may be as well or better served through an
agency of private enterprise than through a department of govern81
ment.” The Court concluded that it could not “say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of com82
munity redevelopment projects.” The Berman Court’s acknowledgacknowledgment that private ownership could serve a public purpose
demonstrates a complete abdication of the traditional public use test,
which required actual use by the public.
Additionally, the Court showed extreme judicial deference for
the definition of public purpose to Congress, which retains ultimate
83
authority over Washington D.C. The Court stated that “the role of
the judiciary in determining whether that power is being exercised
84
for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one.” This set the stage
for dangerous deference to legislatures. The Court further stated
that “it is well within the power of the legislature to determine that
the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well
as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled . . . [and] it is not
85
for us to reappraise them.” Therefore, in addition to demonstrating
deference to the legislature, the Court noted that a “clean community” could pass muster as a “public purpose” to satisfy the Takings
86
Clause. With perhaps the most striking statement regarding deference to Congress, the Court abdicated its constitutionally-required
role to check the power of the legislature: “Once the question of public purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to
be taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative
87
branch.”
Thus, Berman set the stage for Midkiff and Kelo; the
precedent that the Berman Court established is still wreaking havoc in
eminent domain jurisprudence fifty-eight years later.
2.

Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff

Midkiff presented a different question than Berman, yet the Court
applied the Berman precedent and declined to revise its broad inter-

81

Berman, 348 U.S. at 33–34.
Id.
83
The power that Congress has over Washington, D.C. includes all powers that a
state may exercise over its affairs. Id. at 31.
84
Id. at 32.
85
Id. at 33.
86
Id. at 33.
87
Id. at 35–36.
82
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pretation of “public purpose.” The history of land ownership in
Hawaii dates back to the original settlement of the islands by Polyne89
sian immigrants from the western Pacific. The early Hawaiians established a feudal-type system of land ownership, in which the island
high chief controlled the land and assigned it for development to
sub-chiefs, who then re-assigned it to lower ranking chiefs, who found
90
tenants. As a result, Hawaiian land had remained largely in the
91
hands of a few landowners. A 1960 study conducted by the Hawaii
legislature showed that the state and federal governments owned almost forty-nine percent of Hawaii’s land, and that the other fortyseven percent of land was in the hands of only seventy-two landown92
ers. Residents could easily lease land, but it was difficult to purchase
93
fee simple title to their homes.
To correct these issues, the legislature adopted a statute that
permitted tenants living in single-family homes to petition a state
agency, the Hawaii Housing Authority, to condemn the properties
94
and then re-sell the property to the tenants in fee simple. In Midkiff,
the plaintiff landowners sued to invalidate the statute on the grounds
that it authorized an unconstitutional exercise of eminent domain
95
power; the Court disagreed and held that the statute was constitu96
tional.
In making its determination, the Midkiff Court relied on the
97
Berman decision and deferred to the legislature. Justice O’Connor,
writing for the majority, declared that “in short, the Court has made
clear that it will not substitute its judgment for a legislature’s judgment as to what constitutes a public use ‘unless the use be palpably
98
without reasonable foundation.’” The Court recognized that it plays
a role in reviewing a legislature’s judgment as to what constitutes
public use “even when the eminent domain power is equated with the
police power;” however, the Court noted that this role is an “‘ex-

88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
Id. at 232.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 241.
Id. (citing United States v. Gettysburg Elec. R. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896)).
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99

tremely narrow one.’”
To explain its deference, the Court highlighted the legislatures’ abilities “to assess what public purposes
100
should be advanced by an exercise of the takings power.”
The
Court did not seem to consider that, while the political process responds to popular concerns, it also responds to heavily organized and
101
funded interest groups.
In its deference to the legislature, the Midkiff Court established
its “rationally related” test for determining whether or not there is in
102
fact a “public purpose.” The Court affirmed that it had never held
a compensated taking to be prohibited by the Public Use Clause
when the exercise of eminent domain power was rationally related to
103
a conceivable public purpose. The Midkiff Court conclusively established that, when an exercise of eminent domain by the legislature is
questioned, the appropriate question before the Court is not whether
in fact the condemnation serves a public purpose, but whether the
“legislature rationally could have believed that the [law] would pro104
mote its objective.” The Court further explained that even though
the Hawaii Act authorized the use of eminent domain to force a
transfer of private property to private beneficiaries, the transfer could
105
not be condemned automatically as violating the Takings Clause.
According to the Midkiff Court, the state does not have to be the primary user of the property to legitimize the taking; “it is only the taking’s
purpose, and not its mechanics, that must pass scrutiny under the Public Use
106
Clause.”
This “rational relationship” test affords almost no protection to
the landowner. Under Midkiff, most takings will have a public purpose, and therefore, will be permitted. Furthermore, it makes succeeding on a pretext challenge even more difficult because, essentially, any public purpose that the legislature proffers satisfies the test,
which requires the legislature to have only a rational belief that its
eminent domain actions satisfy the stated purpose.

99

Id. at 240 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)).
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244.
101
Julia D. Mahoney, Kelo’s Legacy: Eminent Domain and the Future of Property Rights,
2005 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 126; see discussion infra Part VI.B.
102
Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 242 (quoting W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S.
648, 671–72 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
105
Id. at 243.
106
Id. at 244 (emphasis added).
100
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3.

Kelo v. City of New London

Kelo continued expanding the definition of “public use” and
reinforced the Court’s deference to local government determinations
107
of what constitutes public purpose. New London, Connecticut—an
economically depressed area with a high unemployment rate—
adopted a comprehensive redevelopment plan for its downtown dis108
trict. The plan was “‘projected to create in excess of 1,000 jobs, to
increase tax and other revenues, and to revitalize an economically109
distressed city, including its downtown and waterfront areas.’” Additionally, the redevelopment plan sought to make New London
more attractive by creating leisure and recreational space on the wa110
terfront. Pfizer, the pharmaceutical giant, served as a catalyst to this
redevelopment project by promising to build a $300 million research
facility on the site immediately adjacent to the designated redeve111
lopment area.
City officials used the redevelopment plan to provide Pfizer with a property tax break for ten years to entice Pfizer to
112
build its research division headquarters in the area.
In order for the project to proceed, New London needed to ac113
quire title to the area where the redevelopment was to occur.
114
While many homeowners sold their homes voluntarily, Susette Kelo
115
and the other petitioners refused. Kelo and her neighbors stressed
that their homes were in excellent condition and were not by any de116
finition blighted. The Court acknowledged that there were no allegations that the homeowners’ properties were blighted, but insisted
that the properties be condemned because they were located in the
117
development area. Kelo and the petitioners argued that condemning their properties would not serve the public purposes stated in the
118
project; the Court disagreed.

107

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
Id. at 473.
109
Id. at 472 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 507 (Conn.
2004)).
110
Id. at 474.
111
Id. at 473.
112
Patrick McGeehan, Pfizer to Leave City that Won Land-Use Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
12, 2009 at A1.
113
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 472.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 475.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 490.
108
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This case turned on the question of whether the city’s plan
served a public purpose. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
noted that its precedent had defined public purpose broadly, which
reflected the Court’s “longstanding policy of deference to legislative
119
judgments in this field.” Additionally, the Court reasoned that the
economic benefits to be derived from development in this case were
substantially similar to the benefits that flowed from redevelopments
120
in Berman and Midkiff. Justice Stevens indicated that it would be incongruous to find that the economic benefits here were of a less a
public character than the interests in these previous cases, stating that
“clearly, there [was] no basis for exempting economic development
121
from our traditionally broad understanding of public purpose.”
The Court held that promoting economic development is a traditional and long-accepted function of government and that the determination of the city’s governing body that the area was “sufficiently
distressed to justify a program of economic rejuvenation [was] en122
titled to [the Court’s] deference.” Justice Stevens examined the redevelopment plan and concluded that the plan had to be reviewed as
a comprehensive whole and not on a piecemeal parcel-by-parcel ba123
sis.
Noting that Kelo’s property was not blighted or distressed, he
then determined that the taking satisfied the public use requirement
of the Takings Clause because the plan as a whole “unquestionably
124
serve[d] a public purpose.”
The Court also addressed Kelo’s request that the Court require a
showing of “reasonable certainty” that the expected public benefits
125
would actually accrue. Justice Stevens denounced this request as an
126
unwarranted departure from precedent. He declared that this type
of review was unnecessary because it would be a strain on judicial resources and would ultimately serve as a hindrance to timely completion of condemnation proceedings: “A constitutional rule that required postponement of the judicial approval of every condemnation
until the likelihood of success of the plan had been assured would
unquestionably impose a significant impediment to the successful

119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126

Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480.
See id. at 485–86.
Id.
Id. at 483.
Id. at 484.
Id.
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487.
Id.
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127

consummation of many such plans.”
If only the Court had foresight; in a cruel twist of fate, just eight years after Pfizer’s arrival, the
pharmaceutical giant ceased operations in New London and left for
128
greener pastures in Groton, Connecticut. Pfizer abandoned its new
research facility, located next to a large plot of barren land that was
cleared to make room for a hotel, condos, and stores that were never
129
built.
Kelo and her neighbors lost their homes based on vague
130
promises of new jobs and increased tax revenue —promises that
131
never came to fruition.
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion stressed that rational basis
review does not permit a transfer to a private entity when the transfer
primarily benefits the private party and provides only incidental ben132
efits to the public. The concurrence attempted to provide some assurance to land owners that the Court’s chosen standard of review
133
does protect against these unjustified transfers of property. Justice
Kennedy, however, also emphasized that the government must be afforded a presumption that its actions are reasonable and intended to
134
serve a public purpose.
While trying to ensure that courts would
take pretext claims seriously, Justice Kennedy also reiterated the majority’s position that courts must give deference to legislative deci135
sions. After conducting his own review, Justice Kennedy found that
Pfizer did not motivate the economic redevelopment in New Lon136
Accordingly, New London’s actions survived Justice Kennedon.
137
dy’s “meaningful rational basis review.”
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the presumption that the government agency acted
reasonably will not be warranted for economic-redevelopment takings
138
in which there is favoritism to private parties. After Kelo, however, it
is difficult to think of a situation in which the Court would find that
the primary purpose of the taking was to favor a private party.

127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

Id. at 488.
McGeehan, supra note 112.
Id.
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See McGeehan, supra note 112.
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 493.
Id. at 491.
Id.
Id. at 492.
Id.
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Kelo produced two dissenting opinions.
Justice O’Connor argued that the majority effectively deleted the words “for public use”
140
from the Takings Clause. So long as the local governmental agency
labels a project “economic development,” all private property is vulnerable to a transfer to another private owner, particularly if the new
private owner uses the land in a way that the agency deems more
141
beneficial to the public.
Justice O’Connor called on the courts to
take control of the definition of “public use,” stating that “an external
judicial check on how the public use requirement is interpreted,
however limited, is necessary if this constraint on government power
142
is to retain any meaning.”
She recognized the dangerous consequences of the majority’s decision, observing that it permits the government to take private property that is currently put to ordinary private use, and then give that same property to another private
landowner to put it to a different ordinary private use, so long as this
143
new use creates an incidental benefit to the public. Those incidental benefits could include more jobs, increased tax revenue, or simply
144
the creation of more visually appealing property.
Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which he
urged the Court to return to the original meaning of “public pur145
pose.” Justice Thomas maintained that the original understanding
of the Takings Clause was a meaningful limit on the government’s
eminent domain power; however, the Court’s precedent, including
the majority’s opinion, has construed the public use clause to a “vir146
tual nullity.” Justice Thomas asserted that the holding permits a determination that an expensive urban-renewal project that vaguely
promises public benefits, such as the creation of new jobs and increased tax revenue, but is also extraordinarily agreeable to a large
147
corporation, qualifies as a constitutional taking.
Additionally, Justice Thomas commented on the strange treatment of eminent domain cases in terms of judicial deference; no other property interest
determinations receive the same degree of deference to the legisla-

139

Id. at 494–506 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 506–23 (Thomas, J., dissent-

ing).
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147

Id. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 497.
Id. at 501.
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 501.
Id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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ture as the public use determinations in the eminent domain con148
text.
As a result, one is safe in his home from government intru149
sion, yet his home itself is not safe from governmental taking.
Finally, Justice Thomas warned that the effects of the expanded
150
definition of “public use” would fall disproportionately on the poor,
and he agreed with Justice O’Connor that the beneficiaries of such a
definition would be those with power in the political processes, in151
cluding large corporations and development firms.
Given the strongly-divided Court, the immediate public backlash
152
was not surprising. Rather than imposing higher standards on governments that use eminent domain to transfer land from one private
owner to another, the majority encouraged state governments that
disagreed with the decision to take action to restrict their own takings
153
powers. Following the Kelo decision, forty-two states, not including
New York, passed laws aimed at curbing the abuse of eminent domain
154
for private use.
B.

New York Eminent Domain: Building Empires, Destroying Dreams

The New York State Constitution’s Takings Clause mirrors that
of the United States Constitution, and states: “Private property shall
155
not be taken for public use without just compensation.” The State
Constitution also grants the legislature the power to “provide in such
manner, by such means and upon such terms and conditions as it
may prescribe . . . for the clearance, replanning, reconstruction and
156
rehabilitation of substandard and insanitary areas.”
Additionally,
the State Constitution provides that “the legislature may . . . grant the
157
power of eminent domain to any . . . public corporation.” As a result, the legislature may vest eminent domain power in public corporations, such as the Empire State Development Corporation, so long

148

Id. at 518; see also infra notes 230–34 and accompanying text.
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 518; see also infra notes 230–34 and accompanying text.
150
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 521.
151
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 241–46 and
accompanying text.
152
John Broder, States Curbing Right to Seize Private Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21,
2006, A1.
153
See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489.
154
CASTLE COALITION, supra note 62.
155
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7.
156
N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
157
N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2.
149
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as it requires that these corporations use eminent domain in appropriate instances as determined by the legislature.
In New York, urban renewal projects had their beginnings in
“slum clearance,” whereby development projects aimed to remove
“substandard and insanitary” conditions that threatened the health
158
and welfare of the public.
Throughout the twentieth century,
courts expanded this initial understanding to encompass not only
slum areas, but also areas that suffered from economic underdevelopment and stagnation. Courts found that clearing these underdeveloped areas served a public purpose, even though the areas did not
159
technically qualified as “slums.” New York even began recognizing,
like the Supreme Court, that the government’s use of eminent domain power to transfer private property to a private developer does
160
not change the acceptable nature of the taking.
As the dissent
noted in Goldstein v. New York State Urban Development Corp. upon reviewing eminent domain case law in New York, the special status that
New York courts have afforded to blight determinations makes succeeding on pretext claims—claims that blight is not the true motiva161
tion for the development—especially difficult.
In 1936, the Court of Appeals of New York gave a more narrow
interpretation of the Takings Clause than it would in later deci162
sions. In New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, the New York City
Housing Authority sought to condemn Andrew Muller’s blighted
property as part of a slum clearance effort for the stated public use of
163
protecting the health, safety, and general welfare of the public.
The state agency had already acquired the properties on either side
of Muller’s home and acquisition of his property was necessary for
164
the successful completion of the project.
The court recognized
that, while legislative determinations of public use are not binding on
the courts, these determinations are entitled to high degree of respect because they relate to public conditions, which the legislature
158

Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 330 (N.Y. 1975).
See Vitucci v. N.Y.C. Sch. Constr. Auth., 735 N.Y.S.2d 560 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)
(holding that the condemnation of private property to assist commercial development that may be economically beneficial to the area, even if the condemned properties are not blighted, is appropriate); Cannata v. City of N.Y., 182 N.E.2d 395 (N.Y.
1962) (holding that condemnation is appropriate to eliminate areas of intangible
physical blight).
160
Morris, 335 N.E.2d at 331.
161
921 N.E.2d 164, 187 (N.Y. 2009) (Smith, J., dissenting).
162
See N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936).
163
Id. at 154.
164
Id. at 153.
159
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165

has both the means and the duty to discover. In comparison to lat166
er decisions, the court acknowledged that legislative determinations
of blight are not entitled to complete judicial deference. In this case,
the court found that not only did the government allege that the
proposed redevelopment area was blighted but that it also proved the
167
existence of such conditions.
After finding that the “fundamental
purpose of government is to protect the health, safety and general
168
welfare of the public,” the court held that the removal of the slum
to provide low-income housing was indeed a valid public use because
removal of slums was a “matter of far-reaching public concern,” and
the project would protect and safeguard the entire public from the
169
“menace” of slums.
Importantly, the Muller decision paved the way for future courts
to find that takings for economic redevelopment serve public uses or
170
public purposes.
In dicta, the court stated that a condemning authority is permitted to use eminent domain to promote economic development in blighted areas where “there is an equally heavy capital
171
loss and a diminishing return in taxes.”
Blighted areas, according
to the court, strain local economies because of the large amount of
public funds expended to “maintain health and hospital services for
172
afflicted slum dwellers and to war against crime and immorality.”
While this was not the main holding of the Muller court, it opened
the door for a more expansive view of economic development and its
relationship to blighted areas.
In Kaskel v. Impellitteri, the Court of Appeals of New York stated
that an entire area, not particular parcels, must be examined in determining whether slum clearance is appropriate because “such sta165

Id. at 154.
See infra notes 173–94 and accompanying text.
167
Muller, 1 N.E.2d at 154.
168
Id. at 155. Slums, according to the court, “are the breeding places of disease
which take toll not only from denizens, but, by spread, from the inhabitants of the
entire city and State. Juvenile delinquency, crime and immorality are there born,
find protection and flourish.” Id. at 154.
169
Id. at 156.
170
See Nichols, supra note 54, at 631. Nichols argues that during the time of the
Muller decision, courts in many states, including New York, welcomed the generation
of general public benefits as a justification for the taking by a private party, id. at
626–31, thereby abrogating the earlier narrower public use doctrine that demanded
that “[t]o take property rights from A to transfer to B for B’s private enjoyment is not
a public use, regardless of what ultimate public purpose the transaction is intended
to further.” Id. at 626.
171
Muller, 1 N.E.2d at 154.
172
Id.
166
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tutes would not be very useful if limited to areas where every single
173
building is substandard.” This affirmed the Muller court’s decision
that Muller’s home was properly condemned even if it itself was not
blighted; however, Kaskel took the concept one step further by affirmatively stating that many non-blighted buildings may be condemned
simply due to their unlucky location next to blighted ones. Again,
the court deferred to the legislature’s definitions of blight and public
use; according to the court, the legislature had authorized city officials to make a determination that an area is unsanitary and
174
blighted—a determination that the courts could not overhaul. Because the legislature had determined that slum and blight clearance
constituted a public use, the government officials were authorized to
175
condemn the land. Interestingly, less than two decades after Muller,
the court firmly established that courts must afford the legislature
complete deference in findings of blight, making it nearly impossible
for those findings to be overturned.
The following decades found New York courts embracing a
more flexible definition of “blight” which, according to court in Yonkers Community Development Agency v. Morris, consisted of a multitude of
malleable factors that governmental agencies could mold to fit their
176
needs. The appellate court held in Cannata v. City of New York that
physical, tangible blight is not even necessary to find a “public pur177
pose” for slum clearance.
The court held that condemnation can
173

115 N.E.2d 659, 662 (N.Y. 1953).
Id.
175
Id.
176
335 N.E.2d 327, 332 (N.Y. 1975). The Morris court identified the following as a
definition of blight “universally indorsed [sic] by case law.” Id. at 332.
Many factors and interrelationships of factors may be significant. These
may include such diverse matters as irregularity of the plots, inadequacy of the streets, diversity of land ownership making assemblage of
property difficult, incompatibility of the existing mixture of residential
and industrial property, overcrowding, the incidence of crime, lack of
sanitation, the drain an area makes on municipal services, fire hazards,
traffic congestion, and pollution. It can encompass areas in the
process of deterioration or threatened with it as well as ones already
rendered useless, prevention being an important use. It is “something
more than deteriorated structures. It involves improper land use.
Therefore, its causes, originating many years ago, include not only
outmoded and deteriorated structures, but unwise planning and zoning, poor regulatory code provisions, and inadequate provisions for the
flow of traffic.”
Id. at 332 (quoting John F. Cook, Battle Against Blight, 43 MARQUETTE L. REV. 444, 445
(1960)).
177
Cannata v. City of New York, 221 N.Y.S.2d 457, 458 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961), aff’d,
182 N.E.2d 395 (N.Y. 1962).
174
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be authorized not only for slum clearance but also to eliminate areas
of “intangible” physical blight, which refers to areas that tend to
178
create blight or hinder the productive development of a city.
Rather than reining in the power of the legislature to condemn private
property, the court greatly expanded the government’s authority to
179
employ its takings power.
Relying on decisions from other states,
the court expanded its definitions of “blight” and “public purpose” by
stating that “redevelopment may properly be accomplished by private
persons; and the area condemned may thereafter be properly used
180
for nonresidential purposes.” This decision is troubling because it
marks the moment when the interpretation of “public use” started
permitting the transfer of private property to another private entity if
a state agency determines that the area would benefit from a vague
181
promise of redevelopment.
While the Cannata holding seemed to establish that under New
York’s eminent domain jurisprudence the eminent domain powers of
the government had almost no boundaries, the Morris decision, on its
182
face, appeared to rein in these powers. The court, however, made
clear that its Morris holding was not a true limit on the government’s
183
eminent domain power. The Morris court reiterated that New York
courts do not merely rubber stamp a determination of substandard
conditions in the urban renewal context; rather, the courts must independently determine the existence of a true public purpose and
184
substantiate that determination. While at first blush this appears to
restrain eminent domain power in New York, the court reasoned that
the holding was in line with other New York eminent domain deci185
sions, notably Kaskel.
Accordingly, the court determined that the
government agency presented sufficient evidence to show that the
186
area to be condemned was indeed substandard.
The Morris court
explained that even when the stated public purpose of a project is the
removal of blight, and even though government agencies have wide
discretion in determining what constitutes blight, facts supporting

178

Id.
Id.
180
Id.
181
See Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 189 (N.Y. 2009)
(Smith, J., dissenting).
182
See Morris, 335 N.E.2d at 333.
183
Id. at 334.
184
Id. at 333.
185
Id. (citing Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.E.2d 659, 662 (N.Y. 1953)).
186
Id.
179
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the determination need to be adequately documented. Again, even
though this appears to be a heightened standard, the court quickly
188
noted that meeting such a standard, in the majority of cases, is easy.
Modern New York decisions are continuing the tradition of ever189
In Vitucci v. New
expanding definitions of public use and blight.
York City School Construction Authority, the appellate court acknowledged that the term “public use” is to be broadly interpreted to include “virtually any project that may further the public benefit, utility,
190
or advantage.” The court also authorized the condemnation of private property to assist commercial development that may be economically beneficial to the area, even if the condemnation may benefit a
191
private commercial entity. Remarkably, the court found that if the
government “determines that a new business may create jobs, provide
infrastructure, and stimulate the local economy, those are legitimate
public purposes which justify the use of the power of eminent do192
main.” With such a holding, the court’s deference to the legislature
paved a very clear path for the taking in Kaur.
In Goldstein v. New York State Urban Development Corp., the most recent New York eminent domain decision prior to Kaur, the court
completely removed any judicial check on the government’s eminent
193
domain power. The Goldstein court held that where there is a reasonable difference in opinion as to whether the area in question is in
fact substandard and unsanitary, the court will defer to legislative
194
findings.
V. PROBLEMS WITH LIMITLESS PUBLIC USE
There are numerous problems with both the United States Supreme Court’s and the New York state courts’ interpretations of public use. The expansive definitions of public use give the government
187

Id. at 332.
Morris, 335 N.E.2d at 332.
189
See infra notes 190–94 and accompanying text.
190
735 N.Y.S.2d 560, 562 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
191
Id.
192
Id; see also Byrne v. N.Y. State Office of Parks, Recreation & Historic Pres., 476
N.Y.S.2d 42 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (holding that “public use” constitutes any use
which contributes to the health, safety, general welfare, convenience, or prosperity of
the community). The Byrne court found that the construction of a safe boat refuge at
Port Ontario served a valid public use because it was not only vital to the safety of
boaters but also because the “influx of Federal funds for the project would have a positive impact on the economy.” Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
193
Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 173 (N.Y. 2009).
194
Id.
188
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power to essentially take non-blighted land and the home of a private
party and transfer it into the hands of another private party for the
195
purposes of economic redevelopment.
It appears that the phrase
“economic redevelopment” has magical powers when in the courts’
hands because it invites the courts to look at the entire scope of the
plan, rather than at the stated individual goals of the plan. In these
situations, it would be especially difficult not to find an underlying
public purpose. Rationally, almost any economic redevelopment
project that vaguely promises better parks, more jobs, and increased
tax revenue to the neighborhood— in addition to expanding a large,
private university—would seem to serve a public purpose. Even if the
particular parcel itself is not blighted, the taking of the parcel to facilitate community-wide redevelopment now clearly serves a greater
196
public purpose under the broad interpretation of public use. Judge
Posner posed the following question that gets to the heart of the
problem:
If “economic rejuvenation” is a public use, what is to prevent a city
from condemning the homes of lower-middle-class families and
giving them free of charge to multimillionaires, provided it could
show that the new owners would be likely to pay enough for various local goods and services, and in property and other local taxes, to offset the expense of compensating the owners of the con197
demned properties at market value?

Judge Posner’s insightful question demonstrates the dangers of such
a broad definition of public purpose.
The public purpose test opens the door to Takings Clause abuse
by the government. Some Justices, like Justice Thomas, believe that
the public use definition has gone too far from its original meaning,
which required that the public actually and as a whole “employ” the
198
property. As Justice Thomas asserted in his Kelo dissent, despite incidental benefits to the public from private use, it is disingenuous to
assert that the public is employing the property that the government
199
has awarded to a private individual. Incidental benefits to the public are critical elements of eminent domain jurisprudence; accordingly, much Takings Clause litigation involves claims that the benefits of
195

Zeiner, supra note 45, at 9.
See, e.g., Vitucci v. N.Y.C. Sch. Constr. Auth., 735 N.Y.S.2d 560, 562 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2001).
197
Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term: Forward: A Political Court, 119
HARV. L. REV. 31, 93 (2005).
198
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 508–09 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
199
Id.
196
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the taking are not truly for a public purpose, but rather confer a pri200
vate benefit with only incidental public benefits. Economic redevelopment cases, such as the Kaur case, serve as a prime example of
such pretext challenges.
Courts in the state of New York adhere to a self-titled “public
use” test, and some judges claim that they have not adopted the
broader public purpose test endorsed by the United States Supreme
201
Court.
Although this statement may look neat and tidy on paper,
modern decisions in New York have shown acceptance of a much
broader definition of “public use” than perhaps Judge Smith, who
dissented in Goldstein, is willing to admit. Older decisions, like Muller,
202
may not have been narrow in their interpretation of “public use,”
but at the very least those courts required that “slum clearance” serve
a valid public use by protecting the health, safety, and general welfare
203
of the public.
The Kaur court determined that the “physical, economic, engineering and environmental conditions at the Project site”
served as a valid finding of blight, thus creating a basis for the tak204
ing. This demonstrates the court’s departure from the Muller decision and the adoption of a more malleable definition of blight that
includes other factors, including intangible conditions like economic
205
depression. As a result, the Kaur decision reaffirmed that economic
underdevelopment can serve as a valid basis for taking private property because such economic conditions satisfy a finding of blight.
200

See, e.g., Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010).
See Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 186 (N.Y. 2009)
(Smith, J. dissenting).
The good news from today’s decision is that our Court has not followed
the lead of the United States Supreme Court in rendering the ‘public
use’ restriction on the Eminent Domain Clause virtually meaningless.
The bad news is that the majority is much too deferential to the selfserving determination by the Empire State Development Corporation
(ESDC) that petitioners live in a ‘blighted’ area, and are accordingly
subject to having their homes seized and turned over to a private developer.
Id.
202
Compare N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1936) (holding that
slum clearance was a valid public use because it protects the health, safety, and general welfare of the public), with In re Niagara Falls v. Whirlpool Ry. Co., 15 N.E. 429
(N.Y. 1888) (taking of private property for construction of a privately run sightseeing
railroad was not a public use), and In re Deansville Cemetary Assn., 66 N.Y. 569
(1876) (taking of private land for construction of a cemetery is not a public use), and
Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140 (Sup. Ct. 1843) (taking of land for a private road not allowed).
203
Muller, 1 N.E.2d at 155.
204
Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 731 (emphasis added).
205
Id.
201
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VI. COURTS MUST PROTECT AMERICANS FROM EMINENT DOMAIN
ABUSE BY PLAYING A MORE ACTIVE ROLE
A.

Columbia University’s Bite out of the Big Apple

The plaintiffs in Kaur raised several challenges to the taking of
206
Namely, the plaintiffs claimed that there was no
their property.
true public purpose for the taking and that the project contemplated
207
primarily benefiting a private party, Columbia University. It should
be noted at the outset that, unlike Kelo, in which the city planned the
redevelopment of the waterfront area before Pfizer claimed an inter208
est, Columbia University approached the EDC to redevelop the
209
West Harlem area.
This should have been a big “red flag” to any
court considering a pre-text challenge.
In the Kaur case, the ESDC set forth many public purposes. The
first public purpose that the ESDC proposed addressed the city’s and
statewide “need for education, community, recreational, cultural and
210
other civic facilities.”
The ESDC asserted that the project would
enable the city and the state to maintain their positions as global cen211
ters for higher education and research. Second, the ESDC claimed
that the project would create 14,000 jobs during the construction
212
phase and 6,000 permanent jobs once the project was completed.
Third, the ESDC stated that the project would create “substantial”
revenue, with an estimated $122 million in revenue for the state and
213
$87 million for the city.
Fourth, the ESDC indicated that another
purpose of the project was to create 94,000 square feet of “much
214
needed public space” that would be maintained in perpetuity. This
space would be punctuated by trees, open vistas, paths, landscaping
and street furniture, and an additional 28,000 square feet of widened
215
sidewalks that would invite east-west pedestrian traffic. Additionally,
the project would make necessary infrastructure improvements to the
125th street subway station in addition to the creation and mainten-

206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215

Id. at 730.
Id.
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 473 (2005).
Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 725.
Id. at 729.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 729.
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216

ance of the West Harlem Piers Park. Finally, Columbia would provide rent-free land for forty-nine years to a new public school whose
students would have access to Columbia’s libraries and computer
217
centers.
The new swimming facilities would also be open to the
218
public at large. After examining all of the amenities that the private
university and the ESDC claimed would flow from the creation of the
new campus, it appears that the only aspect of the project that is truly
open for public use is the “desperately needed” public space and the
new swimming pool.
It is on these grounds that the plaintiffs claimed that the stated
public purposes were mere “pretext,” which concealed the grant of a
219
huge benefit to a private entity. The Court of Appeals of New York,
following the footsteps of the New York courts and the Supreme
220
Court, gave heavy deference to the New York State Legislature. The
Kaur court stated that “because the determinations of blight and public purpose are the province of the Legislature, [they] are entitled to
221
The court further explained its defedeference by the Judiciary”
rence to the legislature by referencing its Goldstein decision regarding
the Atlantic Yards; there, the court clarified that judges may substitute their views as to whether the government has properly determined that an area is blighted only when there is no room for rea222
sonable differences of opinion. The court noted that the New York
Constitution grants the legislature broad power to take and clear
substandard and unsanitary areas for redevelopment, and simultaneously deprives the judiciary of the power to interfere with such an
223
exercise of legislative authority.
Because the Kaur court could only apply a rational basis review
to the plaintiff’s pretext claims, it is not surprising that the court
found that the blight determination and the taking were not irration224
al or baseless. For a New York governmental organization to invoke
its eminent domain power and condemn an area as a land use im-

216

Id.
Id.
218
Id.
219
Id. at 731–32.
220
Id. at 730–31.
221
Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 730.
222
Id. (citing Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 172 (N.Y.
2009)).
223
Id. (citing Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 173).
224
See id. at 731.
217
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provement project, the Urban Development Corporation Act provides that the area must meet the following requirements:
That the area in which the project is to be located is a substandard or insanitary area, or is in danger of becoming a substandard or insanitary area and tends to impair and arrest the sound
growth and development of the municipality;
That the project consists of a plan or undertaking for the
clearance, replanning, reconstruction and rehabilitation of such
area and for recreational and other facilities incidental or appurtenant thereto; and
That the plan or undertaking affords maximum opportunity
for participation by private enterprise, consistent with the sound
needs of the municipality as a whole.225

These broad requirements for condemnation would allow most
neighborhoods in New York City to qualify for condemnation under
land use improvement projects. If the legislature does not have an
226
interest in protecting its citizens from eminent domain abuse, then
the courts must step in to place a check on the power of the legislature.
B.

Courts Need to Require More than Vague Promises of Public Benefits

While most states took the initiative to protect their citizens’
property rights in the aftermath of Kelo, New York continued to be,
227
and still is, among the leaders in eminent domain abuse. There is
no serious momentum towards comprehensive legislative reform in
228
New York.
Accordingly, the legislature willingly permits the government to take property of homeowners and businesses for private
229
gain. Furthermore, in what appears to be an odd reality of eminent
domain jurisprudence, courts heavily defer to legislative conclusions
225

N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6260(c)(1)–(3) (McKinney 2010).
CASTLE COALITION, supra note 62.
227
Id.; see also Steven J. Eagle & Lauren A. Perotti, Coping with Kelo: A Potpourri of
Legislative and Judicial Responses, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 799, 850 (2008)
(“[R]ural states, and other tending toward deference toward private property rights,
have been the most active in forbidding condemnation practices that, for the most
part, their subdivisions did not engage in anyway. Those states, largely in the northeast, which have engaged in extensive condemnation activity for private revitalization, largely have resisted change.”).
228
CASTLE COALITION, supra note 62. As of November 2011, New York has not
enacted any laws that protect against eminent domain abuse. However, New York
State Senator Bill Perkins, whose district encompasses Columbia University and the
project area, introduced a bill in 2010 that proposed to give “blight” a firm definition
in order to curb the government’s takings power. S. 6791, 2010 Leg., 232nd Leg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2010).
229
CASTLE COALITION, supra note 62.
226
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230

about what serves a public purpose. As noted by Justice Thomas in
his Kelo dissent, courts do not so heavily rely on legislative determina231
tions in most other areas of the law. Justice Thomas pointed to the
Court’s careful assessments of the reasonableness of a search of a
home and the shackling of a defendant during sentencing proceed232
ings as examples. As a consequence of such legislative deference in
eminent domain cases, Justice Thomas finds a paradox in the Court’s
jurisprudence relating to the home:
[There is] overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has
been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic, when the issue is only whether the government may search a
home. Yet . . . the Court tells us that we are not to “‘second-guess
the City’s considered judgments”‘ when the issue is, instead,
whether the government may take the infinitely more intrusive
step of tearing down petitioners’ homes.233

Essentially, people are free from government intrusion inside their
home, but their homes themselves are not protected from the gov234
ernment’s ability to tear them down. Continuing down the path of
broadening the power of the Takings Clause will lead to dangerous
consequences, as demonstrated by the Kaur decision. The public
purpose test is far too expansive to have any true meaning because so
many economic development projects satisfy the minimal requirements of the test. As a result, such projects would be permitted to
proceed regardless of the true private-benefit nature of the taking.
Furthermore, the public use limitation serves an important role by
requiring that an independent, outside observer make the determi235
nation as to whether there is actual use by the public.
To let the
government agency itself determine what is public use makes the
236
agency simultaneously a judge of and an advocate for its own cause.
Courts need to require that local governments demonstrate with
“reasonable certainty” that the taking of the private property would
bring forth the excepted public benefit.

230
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 517 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
see discussion supra Part IV.
231
Kelo, 545 U.S. at 517 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
232
Id. at 518.
233
Id. at 519 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Payton v. N.Y., 455 U.S. 573, 601
(1980).
234
Id. at 518 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
235
Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 190 (N.Y. 2009)
(Smith, J., dissenting).
236
Id.
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Supporters of judicial deference to legislatures argue that there
are many benefits to such deference. Justice Stevens, in a speech defending the Kelo decision, noted that the “public outcry that greeted
Kelo is some evidence that the political process is up to the task of ad237
In theory, the
dressing” the issues surrounding eminent domain.
legislative and constitutional amendment processes are highly responsive and equipped to evaluate and consider competing public in238
terests.
While the Court has brought about sweeping change in a
239
number of areas, generally, the methodology of constitutional interpretation tends to produce “incremental rather than disconti240
nuous change.”
At the same time, however, the legislature can be largely influ241
enced by public interest groups, leaving some citizens out in the
242
cold without any influence on their local government.
Justice
O’Connor observed in Kelo that citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including large corporations
243
and development firms, would benefit. As noted by scholars, those
groups of people who are primarily targets of urban renewal programs are racial minorities, who do not have the same political sway
244
as their wealthy, white neighbors. Historically, especially following
the Berman decision, racial motivations were often hidden behind the
labels of “slum clearance” or “neighborhood revitalization,” but a
primary goal of these urban renewal projects was to channel minority
settlement into certain areas and to uproot minority communities in
245
other areas.
The West Harlem neighborhood in which Columbia
has staked its flag is primarily a minority community. Often times,
the goals of redevelopment initiatives receive wide praise; meanwhile
237
The Honorable John Paul Stevens, Assoc. J., Supreme C. of the U.S., Judicial
Predilections, Address to the Clark County Bar Association (Aug. 18, 2005), in 6 NEV.
L.J. 1,4 (2005).
238
Mahoney, supra note 101, at 125.
239
Id. Mahoney notes that the Court was able to bring huge transformation in
contracts, commerce, and due process clause doctrine, particularly in the New Deal
era. Id. at 126.
240
Id. at 126. Mahoney suggests that it is reasonable to look to statutes and constitutional amendments for more effective, permanent relief from eminent domain
abuse. Id.
241
Id. at 125.
242
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 505 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
243
Id.
244
Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private
Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 6 (2003).
245
Id. at 47.
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in the poor areas to be redeveloped, neighbors struggle to build
246
community in the midst of abandonment. It is a powerful reminder
that blight, while sometimes obvious, remains in the eye of the be247
holder.
As New York has failed to take any measurable steps towards protecting its citizens’ homes and businesses, those who live
within the boundaries of West Harlem are facing an incalculable
harm and suffering to their businesses, homes and community. The
near-total-deference standard protects only against the most obvious
and egregious abuses, and does not facilitate valid pretext chal248
lenges.
As an alternative to legislative deference, courts should demand
from local governmental organizations a showing of “reasonable certainty” that the expected benefits from an economic redevelopment
project will actually accrue. Opponents to this proposition have
stated that requiring judicial approval of every condemnation until
the likelihood of success of the plan has been sufficiently established
would impose a significant obstacle to the successful consummation
249
of many plans.
However precious and valuable time is to the successful consummation of plans, the actual success of the proposed
redevelopment project, not just the rapidity at which the plan can be
implemented, should be equally important. Suzette Kelo and her
neighbors would have stood a fighting chance of keeping their
homes if the court had required the city to show more than mere
250
promises of more jobs and increased tax revenue.
Instead, in the
place of their former beloved homes there are empty lots of land because the economic development project never came to fruition, presumably never delivering on those promises of increased jobs and
251
other benefits.
If all that is required for a redevelopment plan to
pass muster is a general statement of intended benefits to the public,
then any economic redevelopment plan would pass the test. This is
dangerous and injurious to neighborhoods all over the United States,
particularly in regions, like New York, where there are no legislative
initiatives to limit eminent domain power.
While many plans would likely prove to be successful under the
current standard—meaning that individuals would lose their homes,
businesses, and community—extended judicial review would ensure
246
247
248
249
250
251

Id. at 51–52.
Id.
Mahoney, supra note 101, at 131.
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 488 (2005).
See id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
McGeehan, supra note 112.
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that this loss would, at a minimum, advance a true public purpose. In
the Kaur case, it is possible that the proposed plan would not pass this
heightened scrutiny. The redevelopment plan, like the plan in Kelo,
lists broad estimations of new jobs and increased tax revenue. The
plan, however, lacks specificity. The types of jobs to be created and
an explanation of how the public at large would benefit from implementation of the project are conspicuously absent. At the same time,
however, Columbia University is an established, stable institution. In
contrast to Pfizer, Columbia is unlikely to “pull-out” of the neighborhood because of the proximity of the main campus and the apparent
need to expand the school and its resources.
While this Comment cannot resolve this issue, it is one that deserves the Courts’ careful consideration. Requiring Columbia and
the redevelopment team to show credible evidence that the stated
public benefits would accrue would not unduly burden the affluent
institution. The homes and businesses of the Singhs, Sprayregen,
and their neighbors deserve the same fundamental judicial protections and checks that their other property interests receive.
VII. CONCLUSION
Eminent domain is a powerful land development tool that, when
used appropriately, can have positive effects on communities. At the
same time, eminent domain can be a dangerous weapon when it falls
into the hands of private parties who use eminent domain as a way to
advance their private agenda. The Kaur decision demonstrates just
how powerful private interests can be and is a clear example of the
need for additional judicial protection against this strong force. The
current extreme judicial deference to legislatures provides only minimal protection against radical uses of eminent domain. Courts can
only overturn a governmental finding of blight if it is not rationally
related to the project. As a result, as long as the economic redevelopment projects list certain public benefits, such as new jobs and increased tax revenue, they would likely pass judicial review as constitutional exercises of the Takings Clause.
Courts must have a stronger, more active role in eminent domain challenges, particularly in those challenges in which the plaintiffs claim that the stated public purpose are merely pretexts for conferring benefits on private entities. To accomplish this, courts need
to demand that local governments show a “reasonable certainty” that
the stated public benefits would flow from the project. While this
heightened review is not perfect—as projects with truly pretextual
stated public benefits would fall through the cracks—it would at least
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assure home and business owners that the government will not take
their property without a second check by the courts.

